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Abstract:  
In physics, structures are good candidates for the role of transparadigmatic invariants, 
which entities can no longer play. This is why structural realism looks more credible 
than standard entity realism. But why should structures be stable, rather than entities ? 
Here, structural realists have no answer ; they content themselves with the mere 
observation that this is how things stand. By contrast, transcendental structuralism (a 
byproduct of Kant’s transcendental idealism) can easily make sense of this fact. 
Indeed, it shows that when knowledge bears on phenomena, namely on the emergent 
byproduct of a relation between the explorer and what is to be explored, this 
knowledge necessarily bears on relations between such phenomena. After a 
development on the clarifying power of transcendental structuralism, I turn to an early 
transcendental structuralist interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Jean-
Louis Destouches (1909-1980). Destouches, an early French philosopher of physics, 
was a student of Louis de Broglie. He recasted in the 1940 the very concept of 
physical theory in the light of quantum physics. According to him, whenever 
phenomena are inextricably relative to the experimental set-up, a physical theory 
cannot provide anything beyond a list of interconnected predictions for future facts 
given a relevant class of past facts. In his general mathematical theory of predictions, 
the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics do not refer to some “real” waves; they are 
shown to be nothing but the formal expression of the phenomena’s being relative to 
incompatible experimental contexts. Since the quantization of variables can itself be 
derived from a wave-mechanical formalism, it becomes clear that the most prominent 
features of quantum mechanics are a mere consequence of contextuality. Destouches 
thus proved that it is easy to make sense of quantum mechanics provided a reflective 
attitude is adopted. By contrast, too many difficulties arise when one tries at any cost 
to make quantum mechanics intelligible within a purely ontological framework. 
 
Introduction : structuralism in the atmosphere of 
transcendental epistemology 
 
My primary aim in this paper is to describe some important 
features of Jean-Louis Destouches’ philosophy of physics, and 
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especially his early version of transcendental structuralism. This is 
an important task in itself, since the remarkable, ambitious, and 
strongly argued work of this French forerunner of the studies about 
the foundations of physics (who worked between the 1930s and the 
1950s in the wake of Louis de Broglie’s temporary acceptance of 
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics), remains 
almost entirely ignored nowadays. It is ignored, first of all, by the 
international community of English-speaking philosophers of 
physics, which is understandable due to the fact Destouches was 
almost exclusively writing in French and has never been translated. 
But his work is also little known of the French-speaking 
philosophers of science1, which is more surprising in view of his 
highly advanced and very accurate reflection.  
But before I come to Jean-Louis Destouches, I would like to 
insist from the outset that a transcendental philosophy of science is 
more naturally in tune with structuralism than any variety of 
realism. Whereas structuralism is merely contingent and optional 
for a realist philosophy of science, it is necessary and inescapable 
for a transcendental philosophy of science. Moreover, whereas it 
may be disappointing for a realist philosopher of science to admit 
that we can only know structures, and not entities with their 
intrinsic properties (if any), it is obvious for a transcendentalist 
philosopher of science that objective knowledge is structural by 
definition. Why is it so? 
The main motivation for structural realism is well-documented. 
A reasonable requirement of scientific realism is that scientific 
theories converge asymptotically towards a true grasp of the way 
the world is. Even though one may accept that some sort of instable 
behaviour occurs during the convergence process, it is usually 
accepted that this convergence should manifest itself by an 
increasing amount of historical invariance in the content of 
                                                
1A philosophy of quantum physics making extensive use of Destouches’s ideas has 
nevertheless been developed  by myself: M. Bitbol, Mécanique quantique : une introduction 
philosophique, Paris : Flammarion, 1996 ; M. Bitbol, “Some steps towards a transcendental 
deduction of quantum mechanics”, Philosophia naturalis, 35, 253-280, 1998. Besides, a 
collection of his papers has been published by a major French academic press : P. Février, H. 
Barreau, & G. Lochak (eds.), Jean-Louis Destouches physicien et philosophe, Editions du 
CNRS, 1994 
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scientific theories. But the rate of historical invariance is de facto 
very low when entities (their definition more than their names, that 
can remain artificially stable) are concerned. Larry Laudan’s 
impressive list of forgotten entities is quite enough to show this. If 
scientific realism is to be rescued, it is then clear that the nucleus of 
stability must be sought elsewhere. Now, structures are good 
candidates for this role of transparadigmatic invariants which 
entities can no longer play. Many laws survive across scientific 
revolutions, as limiting cases for the new theory. And some other 
structures, such as the global symmetry principles, are even more 
perennial, since they retain their full generative aptitude 
irrespective of the paradigmatic changes in concepts and practices.  
This sound motivation being granted, structural realism meets 
several objections, usually formulated by advocates of a more 
orthodox version of scientific realism.  Some of these objections 
can be found in the work of Stathis Psillos, and I will just 
summarize two of them, which are especially liable to a 
transcendental solution.  
The first objection is that at no stage of the evolution of science 
can one be certain that a theory does not leave aside some parts of 
the structure of the real world. A structural realist can then accept 
that the theoretical structure does not capture the real structure in 
its entirety, that it is only embeddable within the real structure. But 
in this case, the orthodox realist is likely to point out that there are 
many, possibly an infinite number of, ways of selecting embedded 
structures within a larger structural frame. Isomorphism carries 
very little information in this case.  
The second objection is that one may wonder whether there exist 
some non-structural features in the real world. If one answers 
“yes”, then either the non-structural features can be known and 
structuralism is incomplete, or the asserted non-structural features 
cannot be known and structuralism is caught in the usual 
conundrum of metaphysics: namely perplexity about the dubious 
status of a discourse bearing on the unknowable. Another option is 
to give a negative answer to the former question: “no, there is no 
non-structural feature in the world”. This option is called 
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“eliminative structural realism”. It avoids the pitfalls of 
metaphysics, but it raises other problems. The first problem is mere 
puzzlement: why is the world pure structure? And if this is so, how 
can the appearance of entities and intrinsic properties arise out of 
pure structure? The second problem is that (according to robust 
realists) eliminative structural realism concedes too much to 
idealism. It comes very close to the proposition Weyl took as the 
“central thought of idealism”: “The objective image of the world 
may not admit of any diversity which cannot manifest themselves 
in some diversity of perception”2. 
But once this concession is made, we have every reason to go 
further and inquire into what transcendental idealism, in a Kantian 
or neo-Kantian version, has to say about structuralism. We then 
quickly discover that transcendental philosophies of science have 
answers in store for some of the former questions, and for other 
puzzlements as well.  
To begin with, transcendental philosophy easily accounts for the 
core feature of structuralism. I consider that this core feature is 
relations without (substantial) relata. Let me quote Ferdinand de 
Saussure, the father of structuralism: “For our minds, (relation) 
entails two positive terms between which the (relation) takes place. 
But here is the paradox: in language, there are only (relations) 
without positive terms”3. In Kantian or neo-Kantian epistemology, 
this so-called “paradox” is repeatedly aknowledged. Relations here 
do not connect two substantial entities, but rather objects which are 
themselves nothing else than focal points of stable networks of 
relations. According to Kant, the properties of a substantia 
phaenomenon are only relational, and the so-called subtance itself 
is “totally and fully a set of pure relations”4. As for Cassirer, his 
entire philophy of knowledge is grounded on this leit-motiv. The 
history of science as a whole, says Cassirer, tends towards 
relinquishment of substantial concepts and research of “invariant 
                                                
2 H. Weyl, Philosophy of mathematics and natural sciences, Athenaeum, 1963, p. 117 
3 F. de Saussure, Notes for the “Cours de linguistique générale”, quoted by S. Bouquet, 
Introduction à la lecture de Saussure, Payot, 1997, p. 142. In the text one finds “difference” 
instead of “relation”.  
4 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B321 
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relations” instead5. And if properties are referred to, it is only after 
the concept of property has been (re)defined in such a way that “it 
includes in itself the concept of relation”6. 
This universal agreement about relationism and structuralism 
among transcendental philosophers is not difficult to understand: 
relationism and structuralism are rooted into their most 
fundamental assumptions; especially the so-called “copernican 
revolution” assumption according to which we do not know things 
in themselves but only phenomena. To see this, we must first 
enquire into what is a phenomenon in a kantian context. There are 
several ways of characterizing phenomena in transcendental 
philosophy, but the simplest is expounded in the Transcendental 
Aesthetics. In this well-know introductory part of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, phenomena are byproducts of a relation between our 
faculties of knowledge and whatever we mean when we refer to the 
“thing in itself”. Kant then set up a two-way correspondence 
between the idea that knowledge bears on pure relations and the 
“copernican revolution” assumption; between the idea that we can 
only know relations between objects and the assumption that 
objects are in turn made out of relations between us and some sort 
of thing in itself. Thus, in the last part of the Analytic of Principles, 
we find an argument going from the “Copernican assumption” to 
the core feature of structuralism. There, Kant points out that the 
items that we know can have no intrinsic foundation because they 
are mere phenomena; and since they have no intrinsic foundation, 
they consist in pure extrinsic relations7. Conversely, at the end of 
the Transcendental Aesthetics, the argument goes backwards from 
structuralism to the “Copernican assumption”. Since, in intuition, 
only relations between phenomena are given, an intuitive 
representation can only concern a relation between a subject and its 
objects; it says nothing about a putative intrinsic reality pertaining 
to the thing in itself8.  
                                                
5 E. Cassirer, Philosophie der Symbolishen Formen, Vol 3, Chapter 5 (III) 
6 E. Cassirer, Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie, op. cit. 
7 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B341 
8 ibid. B67 
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These well-known arguments were taken over in 1935 by the 
German Philosopher Grete Hermann9, and applied to Quantum 
Mechanics. According to Hermann, Kant’s arguments about the 
relational-structural nature of knowledge are even more compelling 
in the quantum universe than they were in the classical universe. 
For, in classical physics, the univocity of the system of relations 
between phenomena could still accomodate the belief that the “(...) 
structures of relations are univocally determined by some objective 
connections of things in space and time”. But in quantum 
mechanics the plurality (and “complementarity” in Bohr’s sense) of 
the structures of relations forces one to realize that they ultimately 
express the many available cognitive relations between 
experimental devices and the microscopic “glub” (according to 
Rom Harré’s expression). Kant’s reasoning can no longer be 
evaded. While it was a philosophical luxury in classical physics, it 
becomes a foundational necessity in quantum physics.  
But the resources of transcendental philosophy for structuralism 
do not stop at this point. Speculations about the way the thing in 
itself “affects” our senses had very little appeal on the mind of neo-
Kantian philosophers. Accordingly, they pushed aside any question 
about the origin of phenomena. And they only retained the 
constructive part of Kant’s philosophy, namely his theory of the 
constitution of objectivity by law-like ordering of these 
phenomena. Such a strategy does not weaken the connection 
between structuralism and transcendental philosophy; if anything, 
it makes it even more stringent. Indeed, in this case, the structures 
which are provided in advance by our understanding, or by our 
symbolic system, or even by our regulated practices of research, 
are preconditions for there being objective knowledge at all. No 
other phenomena than those which are ordered according to these 
structures can be treated as objective. For our anticipative 
structures are able to pick out static or dynamic invariants with 
respect to the various situations of the subjects, whereas the 
                                                
9 G. Hermann, Die Naturphilosophische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, French 
translation by L. Soler & A. Schell, Les fondements philosophiques de la mécanique 
quantique, Vrin 1996 
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residual part of the phenomena which does not fall under this 
structural frame, expresses the specific component of each 
situation. In other words, reduction of knowledge to structure is the 
price to be paid for intersubjectivity or intersituationality. Even 
Karl Mannheim, one of the founding fathers of the sociology of 
knowledge, was aware of that. According to him, coordinating the 
variety of individual or collective perspectives entails an ever 
increasing formalization of knowledge10. Individuals and social 
groups can only understand each other at the high stage of 
abstraction provided by structures.  
At this stage, the reason why physical knowledge is structural 
becomes obvious: this is a condition for its being shared across 
spatio-temporal, cultural, and individual situations. Structure is the 
mark of cognitive universality. Some structures in physics can 
almost immediately be understood this way. Not to mention 
Newton’s three laws and their transcendental reading by Kant, I 
may quote Eugen Wigner according to whom time, space, and 
rotation invariance, “(...) are almost necessary prerequisite that it 
be possible to discover, or even catalogue, (...) correlations 
between events”11. The case of many other structures in physics is 
not so clear, but it is a good programme of research to enquire into 
whether the so-called internal or local groups of symmetry can be 
understood as preconditions for coordinating certain classes of 
experimental situations.  
As one now realizes, meeting the objections which have been 
formulated against structural realism is quite easy in the frame of 
transcendental structuralism. The reason why knowledge is 
structural has already been stated, in a Kantian and neo-Kantian 
version: because knowledge only concerns the phenomenal 
byproducts of cognitive relations rather than the intrinsic features 
of reality (Kantian); because structure is the only common 
denominator of the multiplicity of, temporal, spatial, subjective, or 
cultural positions (Neo-Kantian). Eliminative structuralism is 
                                                
10 K. Mannheim, Ideology and utopia, (1936), in: K. Mannheim, Collected works volume 1, 
Routledge, 1997, p. 271 
11E. Wigner, Symmetries and reflections, Ox Bow Press, 1979, p. 29 
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natural in this case. For if there is some non-structural feature left 
aside, this is only subjective or qualitative material, not liable to 
objective knowledge by definition. Moreover, there can be no 
surplus structure at a given stage of the development of physics. 
For here structure means structure of (experimental) anticipation or 
action, and the latter is automatically encompassed by the mature 
physical theory accounting for the corresponding set of 
phenomena. New structure may occur, of course, but it does not 
arise from some stock of preexistant surplus structure; rather from 
a historical development of the (experimental) modes of 
anticipation and action.  
As for the way appearance of entities and properties may arise 
from pure structure, this is explained by the procedure of 
constitution of objects, which consists in extracting a permanent 
nucleus out of changing configurations. As we will see, the 
universality of the procedure of constitution of objectivity becomes 
especially manifest in microphysics where many conditions for 
defining invariants are not fulfilled at the phenomenal level, but 
where the procedure of extracting a permanent nucleus is still 
efficient provided it is deflected towards the predictive formalism 
itself.  
Now, let me come to Jean-Louis Destouches’ attempt in this 
direction.  
 
1-A short intellectual biography of Jean-Louis Destouches 
 
Jean-Louis Destouches was a brilliant French physicist and 
philosopher of physics, and a student of Louis de Broglie. He was 
born in Paris in 1909, he died in Paris in 1980, and he began his 
studies at the Faculté des sciences of the university of Paris in 
1929. There, his teachers of mathematics were Emile Borel and 
Maurice Fréchet, and his teachers of physics were Marie Curie, 
Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Jean Perrin, and, last but not least, 
Louis de Broglie. He attended de Broglie’s first lecture at the 
Collège de France  in 1928, one year before he entered at the 
university, and this gave him a strong motivation to study the 
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foundations of quantum physics. At that time de Broglie had 
relinquished his early pilot wave (and double solution) theory, and 
he taught a personal blend of the so-called “Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics”. This explains the definitely 
“Copenhagian” flavour of Jean-Louis Destouches’ philosophy of 
physics, which persisted even after de Broglie’s re-conversion to 
the pilot wave theory.  
In 1936, after some preliminary studies on second quantization, 
Jean-Louis Destouches started elaborating a “general theory of 
corpuscles and systems of corpuscles” in which he undertook a 
thorough reappraisal of the very concept of particle, and 
accordingly worked out a conception of physical theories as pure 
predictive formalisms. His work culminated in 1942, with the three 
volumes of his Fundamental principles of theoretical physics12. 
Between 1938 and 1942, he also started a fruitful collaboration 
with Paulette Février, a young philosopher of logic who was to 
become his wife. Just after the second world war, he obtained a 
chair of mathematical physics at the university of Paris, and at the 
same time he taught philosophy of physics and philosophy of 
science at the Sorbonne. Many institutions of economy and social 
science also asked him to teach how to apply his powerful and 
highly general “theory of prediction” beyond physics.   
At the beginning of the 1950’s a sort of split occured within the 
intellectual circle of de Broglie. Louis de Broglie himself went 
back to his pre-1927 attempts, and rehearsed some of his former 
ideas on wave-particle duality. He was followed by some of his 
disciples, and he was reinforced by the publication of Bohm’s well-
known papers in 1952.  But J.L. Destouches adopted a critical 
stance with respect to this radical turn of thought of his master. He 
did not content himself with making repeated use of Von 
Neumann’s theorem which was still incorrectly interpreted at that 
time as proving the impossibility of hidden variable theories. In 
anticipation of Bell’s and Kochen’s & Specker’s theorems, he also 
elaborated a new set of arguments against hidden variable theories. 
He found that, if viable theories of this type existed, they would 
                                                
12 J.L. Destouches, Principes fondamentaux de physique théorique, Hermann, 1942 
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have two features which are either self-defeating or inacceptable to 
him: (1) a blend of non-locality and contextualism of properties, 
and (2) underdetermination of their surplus content by any finite or 
infinite set of experimental phenomena. Contextualism of 
properties was expressed thus: “(...) there is no hidden parameter 
description for the system; this description only exists for a given 
couple system+apparatus, not for the system alone”. Such 
involvement of the experimental context is self-defeating because 
the aim of hidden variable theories was precisely to provide us with 
a description of the intrinsic features of the objects under 
investigation. As for the fundamental underdetermination of hidden 
variable theories, it was strongly criticized by Destouches as 
follows: “(an objectivist description which would yield the same 
predictions as quantum mechanics involves processes that are) in 
principle inaccessible to any measurement and which can have no 
relation whatsoever to experiments. Such inaccessible magnitudes 
(and processes) can be called metaphysical (for they can undergo a 
large range of variations without any alteration in empirical 
predictions)”13. The paper where he developed these arguments 
obtained unconditional approval from John Von Neumann and 
Pascual Jordan14, but it met the strong opposition of de Broglie and 
it then remained unpublished until recently.  
In spite of this strong reluctance towards de Broglie’s new trend 
of thought, Jean-Louis Destouches followed very closely the work 
of his mentor during the 1960’s and 1970’s. But he ascribed it an 
original and limited significance. Instead of accepting uncritically 
that de Broglie’s double solution theory somehow picture the 
intrinsic structure of the world, he considered that it expresses 
certain relevant functional relations between phenomena, and that 
it conveys a useful heuristic power. This deflationary construal of 
                                                
13 J.L. Destouches, “Retour sur le passé”, in: A. George (ed.), Louis de Broglie, physicien et 
penseur, Albin Michel, 1953 
14 P. Février, H. Barreau, & G. Lochak (eds.), Jean-Louis Destouches physicien et philosophe, 
Editions du CNRS, 1994 
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de Broglie’s theories was developed in Destouches’ so-called 
“functional theory of corpuscular systems”15. 
 
2-A post-positivist and structuralist philosophy of  science 
 
Now, let me concentrate on Destouches’ own views on the 
philosophy of science and philosophy of physics which were, in 
many respects, ahead of his time.  
Firstly, his general methodological option easily compares with 
John Bell’s. This method consists in transforming all the questions 
about a theory into meta-theoretical questions, in such a way that it 
becomes possible to distinguish contingent from necessary features 
of each given theory, by comparing it with a set of properly defined 
virtual theories. In his own words, the main problem in the 
foundations of physics is that the physicists “(...) never consider in 
a systematical way either a set of possible theories, or the general 
conditions which must be met by any acceptable theory (....)”. To 
overcome this problem, “One must rise one step in abstraction, in 
the same way as one goes from mathematics to meta-
mathematics”16. He thus undertook systematic ‘epi-theoretical’ 
investigations (as he called them) about quantum theories.  
Secondly, it is striking to notice that Destouches already upheld 
in the thirties, approximately at the same time as Popper’s Logic of 
scientific discovery, a post-positivist philosophy of science. 
According to him, it is definitely impossible to verify or even 
justify a scientific theory. Any conceptual construction in science 
must be “(...) undertaken knowing in advance that one does not and 
cannot obtain any permanent basis”17. This being accepted, the 
historical trajectory which has been followed before the physical 
theory reached its mature state, is almost as important as its final 
structure.  
                                                
15 J.L. Destouches & F. Aeschlimann, Les systèmes de corpuscules en theorie fonctionnelle, 
Hermann, 1959 
16 J.L. Destouches, “Les thèses fondamentales de l’idonéisme”, in: Etudes de philosophie des 
sciences en hommage à Ferdinand Gonseth, Bibliothèque scientifique 20, série Dialectica, 
Editions du Griffon, 1950. 
17 J.L. Destouches, Essai sur la forme générale des théories physiques, Institutul de arte 
grafice (Cluj), 1938, p. 1 
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The mark of history is identified by Destouches in axioms. Not 
of course the abstract axioms which are formulated at the ultimate 
stage of the elaboration of a theory, and which are likely to 
eliminate contingent features. But what Destouches calls “an 
axiomatic in the process of formation”18, namely a plastic set of 
assumptions which is provisionally taken for granted by a 
community of scientists. Destouches described the procedure by 
which an “axiomatic in the process of formation” is adopted, as an 
“inductive synthesis”. Despite the presence of the term “induction” 
in it, the expression “inductive synthesis” points toward a method 
which is akin to Peirce’s abduction. Indeed, Destouches insisted : 
“A widespread view is that experimental results are enouth to 
construct a theory. But this is completely wrong (...); as long as one 
has not formulated any simple idea, the experimental material 
remains useless”19. In other words, “inductive synthesis” involves 
synthesis at least as much as induction. Now, synthesis here means 
aggregation of various elements borrowed from previous steps of 
cognitive orientation, in a renewed ascent from particulars to 
concepts. In Destouches’ words, the inductive synthesis is “(...) 
synthesis because its aim is to encompass disparate elements of 
knowledge within a single scheme; and it is inductive because it 
goes from the particular to the general, from partial to complete, 
from concrete to abstract, from certainty to conjecture”20. 
Destouches then insists on the fact that scientific concepts do not 
organize and anticipate an entirely pre-given reality, but rather a 
reality which has already been shaped out by previous frameworks 
of thought. As Nelson Goodman would have it, a new anticipation 
does not rely on previous data only; it also relies heavily on 
previous successful anticipations21.This is especially clear when a 
new theory has to be built in a domain which is partly ruled by a 
previous physical theory. In this case, “(inductive synthesis has to 
be) heterogenous; it has to make use of pieces of deductive 
theories, comparisons with former theories, as well as half-
                                                
18 ibid. p. 76 
19 J.L. Destouches, Physique moderne et philosophie, Hermann, 1939, p. 77 
20 ibid. p. 86 
21 N. Goodman, Fact, fiction and forecast, Harvard University Press, 1983 
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formalized and half intuitive explanations”22. Its only unifying 
principle is the project of formulating the coherent axiomatic of a 
presently unknown theory. When he describes this complex and 
somehow awkward cognitive process, Destouches has in mind the 
recent process of formation of the quantum theory, with its mixture 
of operationnally defined classical variables taken over by means 
of the correspondence principle, and new laws relating these 
variables. But unlike Bohr, Destouches did not think that, for this 
reason, one must say that quantum theory still uses classical 
concepts. For, according to him, a concept depends as much on its 
location within the network of law-like relations in which it is 
embedded, as on its operational definition. If inductive synthesis is 
creative of new theoretical structure, then it is creative of new 
concepts as well, for concepts are nothing over and above the role 
they plays in an integrated web of lateral inter-relations and 
transversal relations with experimental procedure. This is the first 
aspect of Destouches’ structuralism I wanted to point out. 
Also, unlike many positivist philosophers of science, Destouches 
criticizes the supposed bedrock of scientific work, namely 
experimental facts. “It is tempting to call the measurement results 
‘physical reality’ (...) But this reality is far from being a primitive 
given; it rather emerges after a long mental evolution. 
Measurement results can acquire meaning only after the theory in 
which they can be incorporated has been elaborated, and moreover 
the measurement apparatus itself can be understood only by means 
of a theory”23. These remarks about the theory-ladenness of facts 
are almost commonplace nowadays after Popper and the semantic 
conception of theories. But they still retained some provocative 
flavour in the thirties. Here again, they displayed Destouches’ 
structuralist trends. Destouches did not ascribe any meaning to 
isolated items, be they experimental facts or protocol sentences. 
Each item could make sense, according to him, only relative to a 
network of highly interdependent experimental practices and 
preliminary theoretical orientations.   
                                                
22 J.L. Destouches, Essai sur la forme générale des théories physiques, p. 17 
23 ibid. p. 92 
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Another topic of Destouches’ meta-theoretical reflection bears 
on the mutual connections between mature physical theories. 
One must first bear in mind, Destouches points out, that at any 
epoch, several theories are used simultaneously. Some theories are 
quantitatively embedded in one another, which means that it is 
possible to demonstrate that their quantitative predictions converge 
approximately in a certain experimental domain. This is the case 
for classical and quantum mechanics whose quantitative prediction 
converge in the domain where the Planck constant can be 
neglected. Now, there are also theories which, at a given time, 
seem to have completely separate domains of validity. We can 
think of thermodynamics and classical mechanics in the mid-
nineteenth century, or standard quantum mechanics and general 
relativity in the 1920’s. Between these theories, other, non 
convergent, types of relations may be established, such as 
disjunctive domain relations. But the most problematic case is that 
in which the models associated to several theories used at a given 
time involve mutually incompatible pictures and contradictory 
propositions. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, for 
instance, the corpuscular theory of light proposed by Einstein in 
order to account for black-body radiation and photo-electric effects 
was apparently incompatible with the wave picture of 
electromagnetism, which however was still required in order to 
account for interference patterns. What kind of relation is there 
between such types of apparently incompatible theories? Can there 
be relations at all in this case?  
Destouches tackled the problem of the relations between 
incompatible theories by inquiring into nothing less than the 
prospect of unifying them; namely finding a level of description at 
which they appear as several aspects of a single theory. According 
to him, we have no reason to be sure that unification of the multiple 
theoretical strata which are used at a given time is in principle 
possible, especially when some of their components appear 
mutually contradictory. But as a project, unification is part of 
science. Unification of theories may be artificial, but it is a basic 
need which underlies the whole scientific endeavour. As 
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Destouches puts it, unification is “(...) a matter of method, not of 
reality; it is wanted by us, in us, and for us”24. Destouches here 
agrees with Kant, who wrote in his Critique of Judgment that the 
unity of the laws of nature within an integrated system is a 
regulative ideal, subjectively necessary for our faculty of 
knowledge. In other words, the unity of theories is seen by 
Destouches and by Kant as a kind of transcendental pre-condition 
for knowledge. This is a weak variety of transcendental condition 
when compared with the basic conditions of constitution of 
objectivity, yet very pervasive at the highest level of research. The 
relevant question, therefore, is not about the presence or absence of 
theoretical unity as a reflection of an existent or inexistent unity of 
nature. It is rather about how theoretical unification, taken as a 
basic requirement of the cognitive project of science, can be 
fulfilled in any event.  
With this epistemological rather than ontological version of the 
question in mind, Destouches first demonstrated an elementary 
meta-theorem about compatible theories. According to this 
theorem, whenever two theories, with their associated models, “(...) 
are such that no proposition of the first one contradicts a 
proposition of the second one, then there exists a unifying theory 
whose set of primitive terms is the collection of the primitive terms 
of both theories, and whose set of axioms is the logical product of 
the axioms of the two theories”25. But of course, the interesting 
case is not this one; it is rather that of theories whose associated 
models include mutually contradictory propositions. In order to 
unify theories of this type, Jean-Louis Destouches writes, the only 
possible way is to abstract the basic structures of these theories and 
to alter the rules of ordinary logic, especially by restricting the 
scope of the logical product. Once this is done, a new unified 
theory is obtained; in it, the basic structures of the former theories 
is articulated within a non-boolean logical structure. The unified 
theory usually entails unexpected predictions which did not follow 
                                                
24 J.L. Destouches, Physique moderne et philosophie, op. cit. p. 63 
25 J.L. Destouches, Physique moderne et philosophie, op. cit. p. 63-64; also J.L. Destouches, 
Essai sur l’unité des théories physiques, Institutul de arte grafice (Cluj), 1938 
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from the constituent theories. Now, writes Destouches, altering 
logic is tantamount to restricting the validity of each proposition to 
a well-defined context of speech, and to ascribe meaning only to 
those propositions whose relevant context does not involve the 
conjunction of two or more mutually incompatible contexts. In 
other terms “these modification of logic entail (...) Bohr’s 
complementarity”26. Interestingly, thus, quantum mechanics, with 
its unification of the corpuscle picture and the wave picture in a 
general formalism which orders contextual propositions and which 
is underpinned by a non-classical logic, appears as a special case of 
a much more general situation. The final outcome of this 
discussion is that, whenever it is meant to absorb two mutually 
inconsistant theoretical models, the resulting unified theory is 
bound to make quite explicit the background contexts of 
experimental investigations. It cannot dispense with a reflective 
analysis of the instruments of investigation, thus contrasting with 
other theories which can ignore contexts and concentrate on the 
description of their object. Thus, in general, according to 
Destouches, the ideal of unification of theories entail renunciation 
to another regulative ideal of science: namely the ideal of making 
scientific propositions so entirely independent of the process of 
acquisition of knowledge that they can be construed as propositions 
bearing on intrinsic properties of pre-existing objects.  
To summarize: 
(i) A prerequirement of unification is identical to the preliminary 
move of any transcendental philosophy of science: reversing focus 
from objects to our mode of knowledge of objects27.  
(ii) Part of the contents of theories is determined by constraints 
of intertheoretical relationship. This is structuralism at a meta-
theoretical level. 
 
3-Transcendental structuralism in the philosophy of quantum 
mechanics 
                                                
26 ibid. 
27I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, (new edition, by V. Politis), Everyman's library, 1993, B25, 
p. 43 
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But what I call “Destouches’ transcendental structuralism” is 
even more explicit in his detailed reconstruction of quantum 
theories. According to Destouches, structuralism is forced upon us 
by the all-pervasive contextuality which underpins quantum 
mechanics. More precisely, a theory in which pairs of conjugate 
variables do not commute, due to the incompatibility of the 
corresponding measurements, can only be a theory of pure 
structures. But why is it so? Destouches’ explanation is contained 
in a crucial paragraph of the first volume of the Fundamental 
principles of theoretical physics: “A physics in which some pairs 
of simultaneous measurements are impossible cannot be a physics 
of intrinsic properties. It is bound to be a physics of pure relations. 
(...) The theory will only provide us with predictions for future 
measurements, from the outcome of previous measurements. In this 
theory, the elements of prediction and all the other elements are 
articulated by a certain number of relations. (...) Now, a set E of 
elements and a set R of relations taken together (E,R) can be called 
a structure. (...) For any category of elements that is contained in 
our physical theory, we are led to this kind of structures. The latter 
structures play the most fundamental role; hence the name 
‘structural physics’ we give to our theory”28.  
Destouches here makes two distinct statements: 
(1) Since contextuality entails lack of knowledge of intrinsic 
properties, we can only hope to grasp relations and structures.  
(2) These structures concern not directly the phenomena, but the 
so-called « elements of prediction » of the theory. 
The first statement is quite similar to Kant’s29: the reason why 
the objects of our knowledge only consist in relations is that they 
are pure phenomena. For these phenomena are in turn the 
byproduct of epistemic relations between the thing in itself and our 
senses. But Destouches also adds a distinctive quantum component 
to that argument. Whereas in classical physics, nothing prevented 
one from behaving as if the phenomena reflected intrinsic 
                                                
28 J.L. Destouches, Principes fondamentaux de physique théorique, op. cit. Volume 1, p. 164 
29 I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, op. cit. B. 340 
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properties (this is the well-known kantian Als Ob), in quantum 
physics, even the as if is precluded. Indeed, the phenomena are not 
stable enough across series of measurements of complementary 
variables to be treated as direct reflections of invariant properties. 
If as if properties are needed, their relation to phenomena must be 
made utterly indirect, as it is the case in contextualist and non-local 
hidden variable theories.  
As for the second statement of Destouches, it departs even more 
from Kant. According to Kant, in physics, we can only know 
relations between phenomena. But according to Destouches, in 
quantum physics, we know even less: relations between elements 
of prediction, namely between those mathematical tools used to 
calculate probabilities of given phenomena. Here, the structure 
concerns mediately the probabilistic rules, and only immediately 
the phenomena. 
To sum up, Destouches transcendental structuralism is at the 
same time more radical and weaker than Kant’s. It is more radical 
because, due to complementarity and contextuality, it is so to speak 
inescapable. And it is weaker, because the structures organize a set 
of entities (say probabilistic algorithms) which are more remote 
from whatever one may call “reality” than the phenomena they 
help to predict.  
Let us now further inquire into some consequences of 
Destouches’ reflective stance. The first consequence bears on the 
classification of the different parts of physics. Let us accept, in 
conformity with the basic assumption of transcendentalism, that 
physics does not claim to predicate anything of pre-existing 
objects; that it only accounts for relations between objectified 
phenomena which in turn are the byproducts of relations between 
nature and experimenters approaching it with certain technical and 
conceptual presuppositions. If this is the case, the subdivisions of 
physics cannot be determined by the variety of its objects, but 
rather by the variety of its modes of investigation. A consequence 
of this new criterion is provided by the subdivisions of Destouches’ 
Fundamental principles of theoretical physics. The second and 
third volumes of this treatise are respectively entitled: Physics of 
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the individual and Physics of the collective. A superficial reading 
of these titles, influenced by the usual prejudice according to which 
parts of physics are defined by their objects, may induce one to 
think that the first part of the treatise is about isolated particles 
whereas the second part is about sets of interacting particles. But 
this is not so. The physics of the individual deals with the relation 
which can be established between systems and an individual 
experimenter by means of instruments. And the physics of the 
collective bears on the coordination of the information obtained by 
several experimenters distributed in various spatial locations and in 
various inertial frames. In other terms, the so-called physics of the 
individual essentially reduces to standard quantum mechanics, 
whereas the physics of the collective adds to it the relativistic group 
of transformation. 
Another consequence of Destouches’ reflective stance is his 
study of the very nature of physical theories. If no feature of 
phenomena had forced us to relinquish the idea (or the as if belief) 
that they just reveal intrinsic properties of pre-existing objects, 
theories could be ascribed the project of describing these properties 
and their evolution. But provided we have been led to accept, with 
Bohr, that each experimental result expresses an isolated and 
unanalysable interaction between systems and apparatuses, the 
theory cannot keep on with its former project, lest it relies on a 
discourse (which Destouches calls “metaphysical”) about 
essentially hidden predicates30. As mentioned in Destouches’ 
definition of structural physics, this theory must then content itself 
with providing predictions for future experimental results under the 
condition of one or several past experimental results. Here, 
prediction is not and cannot be a byproduct of some underlying 
description; it is primary. Quantum mechanics is a primarily and 
fundamentally predictive theory. 
This minimal goal of theories, namely prediction of phenomena, 
was already considered as the only legitimate aim, by some 
philosophers of science in the time of classical physics. It is enough 
                                                
30 J.L. Destouches, “Retour sur le passé”, in: A. George (ed.), Louis de Broglie, physicien et 
penseur, Albin Michel, 1953 
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to remind Ernst Mach’s or Pierre Duhem’s position31, according to 
whom the physical theory does not have to provide explanations 
but only an economical classification and an anticipation of 
phenomena. But this option can prevail itself of much more 
compelling arguments in quantum physics than in classical physics.  
The first argument is that the very concept of a phenomenon has 
undergone severe alterations from classical to quantum physics. 
Whereas Duhem still speaks of properties to which measurements 
associate an ordinal symbol, Bohr, and Destouches after him, 
consider that the measurement is co-constitutive of a phenomenon. 
This being granted, one must realize that predicting phenomena 
which depend for their very definition on a certain constitutive 
experimental context can, and must, be made independently of any 
description of pre-existing physical processes.  
The second argument is a theorem due to Paulette Destouches-
Février32 about indeterminism. This theorem shows that any theory 
which deals with contextual phenomena, and which is such that the 
relevant contexts are sometimes incompatible, is “essentially 
indeterminist”. By saying that this kind of theory is “essentially 
indeterminist”, Paulette Février means that it cannot be interpreted 
as describing statistically some underlying variables having “a 
physical meaning”. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility 
of hidden variable theories, but this imposes that the hidden 
processes can have no “physical meaning” in the sense Jean-Louis 
Destouches and Paulette Février ascribe to this expression. This 
imposes in other words that the hidden processes, if any, have no 
possibility, even remote, of becoming one day accessible to 
experiments.   
These two circumstances led Destouches to develop a “general 
theory of (probabilistic) predictions”, of which quantum mechanics 
is a special instance, and from which classical theories can be 
derived as even more special instances. Let me summarize the most 
important components of Destouches’ “general theory of 
predictions”, first stated (in 1941) in the first volume of his book 
                                                
31 P. Duhem, La théorie physique, Vrin, 1989 
32 P. Destouches-Février, La structure des théories physiques, P.U.F., 1951 
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Corpuscles and systems of corpuscles. Firstly, Destouches 
demonstrates that it is always possible to analyse any procedure of 
prediction in three steps. These steps are the following:  
(1) associate with the preparation of some experiment a unique 
initial “element of prediction” which, unlike probabilities, does not 
depend on the measurement to be performed after the preparation,  
(2) calculate a symbol of prediction at any time from the symbol 
of prediction at time t=0, and,  
(3) assess the probabilities of a given set of contextual outcomes 
of measurements at any time from the element of prediction at this 
time.  
Secondly Destouches analyses the third step, namely the 
assessment of probabilities by using an element of prediction, in 
three more parts. These three further parts are the following:  
(1’) determine the basic elements of prediction of the variable to 
be measured, namely the elements of prediction which would yield 
probability 1 for a given value of the variable,  
(2’) after having completed the set of elements of prediction in 
such a way that it acquires the structure of a vector space, make the 
relevant element of prediction correspond to a linear superposition 
of the basic elements of prediction, and, 
(3’) show that the probability that a given value of the variable 
be measured, is a function of the coefficient which multiplies the 
corresponding basic symbol of prediction in the linear 
superposition.  
The most interesting part of Destouches’ endeavour concerns the 
latter point, namely the determination of the function which 
associates a certain probabilistic valuation to each coefficient of the 
linear superposition. In the initial version of the general theory of 
predictions, namely in Corpuscles and systems of corpuscles, 
Destouches contented himself with some restricting theorems 
showing that there is a well-defined class of acceptable functions 
for probabilistic valuations. But in 1946, Paulette Février33 used a 
generalized form of the Pythagoras theorem borrowed from von 
                                                
33 P. Février, “Signification profonde du principe de décomposition spectrale”, Compte-
Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences, 222, 867-868, 1946 
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Neumann, to show that whenever a single symbol of prediction is 
used in order to predict the probabilities of phenomena in two or 
more mutually incompatible experimental contexts, the acceptable 
probabilistic function becomes unique. Now, this unique function 
is such that the probability of obtaining the value of a certain 
variable is equal to the square modulus of the corresponding 
coefficient in the linear superposition. This is exactly Born’s rule, 
or alternatively the formula which gives the intensity of each 
chromatic component in a wave.  
With this remarkable result in mind, Paulette Février and her 
husband Jean-Louis Destouches were entitled to claim that they 
had finally clarified the “deeper meaning” of the strange 
“probability waves” that occur in quantum mechanics. This 
meaning is not that probability waves somehow describe real 
waves out there, as de Broglie contended in 1923; it is rather that 
wave-like distributions of discrete phenomena are the most specific 
mark of the relativity of these phenomena with respect to mutually 
incompatible contexts. And since (i) the quantization of variables 
could be derived from the wave-like formalism of quantum 
mechanics, and (ii) indeterminism had already been derived 
directly from contextuality, Paulette Février and Jean-Louis 
Destouches concluded that every single distinctive feature of 
quantum mechanics was nothing more than a consequence of the 
contextuality of phenomena combined with the incompatibility of 
certain couples of contexts. At that point, Jean-Louis Destouches 
and Paulette Février had the feeling that they had made a major 
meta-theoretical discovery. They thus published together a paper 
entitled “On the physical interpretation of wave mechanics”34. 
They concluded their paper with the following enthusiastic 
sentences: “Every characteristic of the quantum theories devive 
from the former principles. Now, apart from the second principle 
(of subjectivity), these principles underly all the physical theories. 
If one retains, instead of this second principle, a principle of 
objectivity (existence of state magnitudes), one obtains classical 
                                                
34 J.L. Destouches & P. Février, “Sur l’interpretation physique de la mécanique ondulatoire”, 
Compte-Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences, 222, 1087-1089, 1946 
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theories. But if one retains the principle of subjectivity, one obtains 
the quantum theories. (...) Thus, the mystery of quanta disappears: 
the quanta originate in the inexistence of a fully objective external 
world, independent of the way one makes experiments on it. There 
has been a shift of objectivity. The results of measurements are 
properties of the complex apparatus-system, without any possibility 
of telling the contribution of the system in the result. This is 
enough to explain quantization and all the other characteristics of 
quantum theories”.  
I realize that these formulations of Destouches and Destouches-
Février are quite misleading. They make a fuzzy reference to 
“subjectivity”, when nothing else than contextuality is concerned. 
And they adopt a metaphysical stance to assert the “inexistence” of 
a fully objective external world, whereas they should content 
themselves with pragmatic remarks about the impossibility of 
treating phenomena as if they were direct reflections of properties.  
However, provided one avoids these improper wordings, provided 
one complements their analysis with more recent results, such as 
Gleason’s theorem, I think the conclusion of J.L. Destouches and 
P. Février can still be upheld nowadays35. This conclusion is 
tantamount to showing that the basic framework of quantum 
theories is the most economic structural precondition of a unified 
system of probabilistic predictions bearing on contextual 
phenomena. In other terms, the structure of a theory is accounted 
for, in a large proportion, by a transcendental argument. This is the 
highest ambition of transcendental structuralism.  
Now, Jean-Louis Destouches did not restrict his contextualist 
critique of the ontological furniture of physics to the properties of 
physical systems. He extended this critique to the systems 
themselves. According to him, the concept of a physical system is 
relative to an operational procedure of parcelling out, or in other 
words of “splitting up of the undifferentiated reality”36. This being 
granted, physicists are allowed to keep on with an almost unaltered 
                                                
35 M. Bitbol, Mécanique quantique, une introduction philosophique, Paris : Flammarion, 
1996; M. Bitbol, “Some steps towards a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics”, 
Philosophia Naturalis, 35, 253-280, 1998 
36 J.L. Destouches, Principes fondamentaux de physique théorique, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 177 
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mode of speech provided they do not forget that it has a very 
limited scope. According to Destouches, “We can perfectly use an 
almost realist language to speak about physical systems and their 
parts, although we know that this language has no longer an 
absolute value, ‘in itself’, but is relative to (a certain experimental 
method)”37. Actually, things are slightly more complicated than 
what is implied by this sentence. In view of Kant’s critical 
philosophy, physics, either classical or quantum, is never 
concerned by things in themselves. Then, the problem is not to 
know whether quantum physics deals with things in themselves or 
not (since the answer to that question is negative from the outset), 
but once again whether the order of microscopic phenomena is 
such that one may speak as if they manifested the behaviour of 
systems having intrinsic properties and an intrinsic existence. 
Destouches’ answer to the latter question also is clearly negative. 
He does not only insist that the order of phenomena which are 
relative to incompatible contexts is not such that one can speak and 
behave as if they manifested intrinsic properties. According to him, 
this order of phenomena also challenges the possibility of speaking 
and behaving as if a well-defined number of systems pre-exists to 
any experiment. Indeed, the concept of physical systems requires 
not only that a procedure of splitting up has been led to completion, 
but also that the byproducts of the said splitting up can be 
individualized and reidentified across time38. Individualization and 
reidentification across time being not always possible, one often 
deals with indiscernible microsystems. The problem, says 
Destouches, is then that indiscernible objects can no longer be 
arranged in a definite order or counted39. Sets of microobjects must 
be ascribed very peculiar characteristics, which do not even allow 
one to treat them according to classical set theory. As Destouches 
points out, “(...) one may ascribe a cardinal number to a set of 
physical elements of the same species, but one cannot establish any 
ordering between elements; in this case, the concept of ordinal 
                                                
37 ibid. p. 177 
38 ibid. p. 270 sq. 
39 ibid. p. 281; also chapter I of Corpuscules et systèmes de corpuscules, op. cit. 
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number is completely devoid of physical meaning”40. But if the 
concept of ordinal number is generally devoid of physical meaning, 
if procedures of continuous monitoring and counting are generally 
precluded, then one must realize that the ascription of a cardinal 
number to a set of physical elements cannot be dissociated from the 
very act of “splitting up” which defines them. In the same way as 
dynamical properties of microsystems have been replaced by 
relational observables, the property “number of elements” ascribed 
to sets of microsystems have therefore to be replaced by an 
appropriate relational observable. The property “number of 
elements” is just as relative to the process of splitting up as any 
other property. 
One may notice incidentally at this point that the modified set 
theory (or quasi-set theory) developed by G. Toraldo di Francia 
and D. Krause41 to deal with the problem of indiscernible 
microsystems, can be considered as a modern development of these 
early reflections of Jean-Louis Destouches. Indeed, its central 
feature precisely consists in modifying the extensionality axiom in 
such a way that a set can have a cardinal without having an ordinal 
number. 
 
Conclusion 
  
To sum up, Jean-Louis Destouches was fully aware, as Ernst 
Cassirer was at about the same time, that the quantum revolution 
could not be restricted to a change from deterministic to 
indeterministic laws. He thought, in the same way as the most 
radical advocates of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, that this revolution was bound either to jeopardize the 
very ontological furniture of classical physics, or to confine the 
latter ontology in a metaphysical world devoid of any empirical 
content. Accordingly, he applied his transcendental structuralism 
not only to properties but also to entities. Any descriptive discourse 
                                                
40 ibid. p. 180 
41 M-L. Dalla Chiara & G. Toraldo di Francia, “Individuals, kinds and names in physics”, in: 
G. Corsi et al. (eds.), Bridging the gap: philosophy, mathematics and physics, Kluwer, 1993; 
D. Krause, “On a quasi-set theory”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 33, 402-411, 1992 
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about the hypothetical bearers of properties was discarded, and 
replaced by a network of relations between symbols allowing 
prediction of phenomena. True, later investigation into the 
foundations of quantum mechanics showed that this view could 
take advantage of no decisive proof. But it opened  an alternative 
philosophical research program, which is just as promising as the 
ongoing “realist” program (including its structuralist version), and 
which moreover has some advantages over the latter. Among these 
advantages I would like to single out two of them: 
(i) Transcendental structuralism is very much in tune with the 
current connectionist and non-representationalist trend in the 
theories of cognition; and we know that synergy between cognitive 
science and philosophy of science is presently a very powerful 
incentive for both disciplins; 
(ii) Transcendental structuralism also provides a natural 
philosophical frame for several recent derivations of quantum 
mechanics from information-theoretical assumptions, such as 
Zeilinger’s or Bub’s.  
